Changes of regime oblige the new authorities to come to terms with the legacy of the past, and democratic transitions have been fertile ground for attitudes that are more or less radical in relation to the elimination of authoritarian legacies, and, in particular, the political punishment of élites and dissolution of the institutions with which they are associated. Samuel Huntington argues that the emergence, or non-emergence, of ‘transitional justice’ is less a moral question, and more one relating to the ‘distribution of power during and after the transition’. In simple terms, ‘only in those states where political authority radically collapsed and was replaced by an opposition did the possibility of prosecution present itself’.1 In transitions by reform, in which the authoritarian élite is a powerful partner in the transitional process, the scope for the introduction of retributive measures is limited.

Huntington was writing in 1990, when the transitions in central and eastern Europe were only just beginning, and in many cases the calls for punishment and reparations continued, even in the negotiated transitions that had already resulted in consolidated democracies, in apparent counter-examples to his assumptions.2 However, when we take an overall view of the democratic transitions at the end of the twentieth century, if we differentiate between transitional and retroactive justice tout court, we see that Huntington was correct, since we are dealing with the former, and not the latter. That is to say, when ‘proceedings begin shortly after the transition and come to end within, say, five years’, we are referring to what Jon Elster calls ‘immediate transitional justice’.3 We are dealing with a dimension of regime change: the processes of retribution as a dynamic element of democratic transition. Accountability is central to the very definition of democracy, and new processes can be unleashed in any post-authoritarian democracy, even though the time dimension tends to attenuate the retributive pressures, particularly when there has already been a degree of

retribution during the initial phase of democratization. On the other hand, the factors that can unleash retroactive justice processes after the transitions may already have another much larger set of factors; being, for example, one more weapon of party conflict, as was the case in some central European countries in which there are examples of the successful democratic and electoral reconversion of former communist parties.

During their initial phase, almost all democratization processes create 'retributive emotions' that are independent of the type of transition. In the case of right-wing authoritarian regimes, the criminalization of a section of the elite, and the dissolution of the repressive institutions, constitutes part of the political programme of the clandestine opposition parties. Even in the Spanish case, which is a paradigmatic example of a 'consensual decision to ignore the past', these demands were present. In 'post-totalitarian' regimes (to use Juan Linz's term), the pressures for criminalization were present from the very earliest moments of the transition. On the other hand, even when dealing with the majority of cases of élite-driven processes, where public opinion data exist, they tend to show that the élites were 'meeting a societal demand'. The successful implementation of purges depends on the type of transition.

The type of dictatorial regime is important for determining the extent of success of regime change, and for the legacies for a successful democratic consolidation. However, even over the long term, there is a positive correlation between the degree of repressive violence and the persistence of 'retributive emotions', the conduct of the old regime does not explain the extent and degree of these emotions after its fall. Some authors suggest that those dictatorial regimes with the most 'limited pluralism', and which have a more discrete record of repression during their final years (for example, Portugal, Hungary, Poland), would face little pressure for retribution; however, the examples of southern Europe, Latin America and central Europe do not confirm this hypothesis, because such pressures were present even in these cases.

In this respect, the Portuguese transition to democracy is a particularly interesting case because of the authoritarian regime’s longevity and the *ruptura* ('rupture') nature of its regime change, with the collapse of the New State on 25 April 1974. Moreover, because Portugal was the first of the so-called 'third-wave' of democratic transitions, there were few models available to inspire it, and none to directly influence it. Portugal was, as Nancy Bermeo has claimed, an example of 'democracy after war', in which the military played a determinant role in the downfall of the dictatorship, opening a swift and important state crisis during the initial phase of the transition.

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The comparative literature on transitions has always incorporated the Portuguese case; however, some of its characteristics, particularly the role of the military, the crisis of the state and the dynamics of the social movements, constitute elements that are difficult to integrate into the comparative analysis of democratization. As Juan Linz and Alfred Stepan have noted: ‘we all too often tend to see [Portugal] in the framework set by later transitions processes’, forgetting the greater degree of uncertainty and the ‘extreme conflict path’ of a regime change that, according to some authors, ‘was not a conscious transition to democracy’. In fact, one of the limitations of some analyses of Portugal’s transition is their assumption of finality, based on the subsequent consolidation. This assumption underestimates both the state crises and the ‘revolutionary critical juncture’ of the transition. The author of one of the best studies of political mobilization and collective action in Portugal during the 1970s notes the methodological difficulties involved in ‘assimilating *a priori* the State crisis with the transition to democracy’, but is precisely this that represents the challenge for any analysis of Portuguese democratization.

The nature of the Portuguese dictatorship tells us little about the nature of the country’s transition to democracy. Salazarism was close to Linz’s ideal-type of authoritarian regime: it was a regime that survived the ‘fascist era’, and was not too dissimilar in nature from the final phase of neighbouring Spain’s Franco regime, despite its single party being weaker, and its ‘limited pluralism’ greater. In 1968, Salazar was replaced by Marcelo Caetano, who initiated a limited and timid regime of ‘liberalization’ that was swiftly halted by the worsening colonial war. The inability of Salazar’s successor to resolve some of the dilemmas caused by the war provoked the outbreak of a *coup d’état* in April 1974. This was a ‘non-hierarchical’ military coup, which had a political programme that promoted democratization and decolonization.

Unlike Spain’s *ruptura pactada* (‘negotiated rupture’), Portugal underwent a transition without negotiations or pacts between the dictatorial élite and the opposition forces. However, there is no direct causal link between this marked discontinuity and the subsequent process of radicalization: other transitions by rupture did not cause comparable crises of the state. As will be shown below, the simultaneous character of the democratization and decolonization processes was one factor of the crisis, while the latter was the main reason for the conflict that broke out in the immediate wake of the regime’s collapse between some conservative generals and the Movimento das Forças Armadas (MFA — Armed Forces’ Movement), which had planned and executed the coup. This conflict was at the root of the military’s generalized intervention in political life following the dictatorship’s overthrow. The rapid emergence of transgressive collective actions can be explained by this crisis, although it was not these that provoked the state crisis.

The institutionalization of the MFA transformed it into the dominant force behind the provisional governments. The ‘interweaving of the MFA in the

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State’s structures’ and its emergence as an authority for regulating conflicts, which substituted, dispersed and paralysed the classic mechanisms of legitimate state repression, prevented ‘the re-composition of the State apparatus’. This was the main factor explaining why, in the Portuguese case, the movement for the dissolution of institutions and purges exceeded those of classic purges in transitions by rupture and, in many cases, came to be a component of the transgressing social movements.

The nature of the Portuguese transition and the consequent state crises created a ‘window of opportunity’ in which the ‘reaction to the past’ was much stronger in Portugal than in the other southern European transitions. The transition’s powerful dynamic in itself served to constitute a legacy for the consolidation of democracy.

The Portuguese military coup of 25 April 1974 was the beginning of the ‘third wave’ of democratic transitions in southern Europe. Unshackled by international pro-democratizing forces and occurring in the midst of the Cold War, the coup led to a severe crisis of the state that was aggravated by the simultaneous processes of transition to democracy and decolonization of what was the last European colonial empire.

The singularity of this period resides in the nature of military intervention by the captains, a rare if not unique case in the twentieth century. The three-front war waged by the regime in Angola, Mozambique and Guinea-Bissau from 1961 onwards made the military protagonists in the country’s political transformation.

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9 This is the view of, amongst others, Manuel de Lucena, *O Estado da Revolução* (Lisbon 1978). See the more recent work by Robert M. Fishman, ‘Legacies of Democratizing Reform and Revolution: Portugal and Spain Compared’, paper presented to the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association (Chicago 2004).


The prior existence of a semi-legal and clandestine opposition to Salazarism, although disconnected from the military officers who led the coup, was of crucial importance. It constituted a political option legitimated by the struggle against dictatorship. The replacement of Salazar by Marcelo Caetano in 1968 for health reasons gave rise to a two-year liberalization process, which, although it was cut short, allowed for the consolidation of a ‘liberal wing’ of dissidents opposed to the dictatorship. The creation of SEDES in 1970 further consolidated this dissident ‘liberal wing’. Thus, despite the surprising action of the military, there were alternative elites who had close connections with various sectors of civil society, and who were ready to play a leading political role in the democratization process.

The ‘revolutionary period’ of 1974–1976 was the most complex phase of the transition, if one considers the transition as the ‘fluid and uncertain period in which democratic structures are emerging’, but in which it is still unclear what kind of regime is to be established. During these two years powerful tensions emerged within Portuguese society, which began to subside in 1976, when a new constitution was approved and the first legislative and presidential elections were held.

Unlike Spain’s ruptura pactada, Portugal underwent a transition without negotiations or pacts between the dictatorial élite and the opposition forces. But there is no direct causal link between this marked discontinuity and the subsequent process of radicalization: other transitions by rupture did not cause comparable crises of the state.

The mobilization of diverse anti-dictatorial forces was crucial in the first days after the coup of 1974. It was especially important in the immediate dissolution of the most notorious institutions of the New State, as well as in the occupation of various unions, corporatist organizations and municipalities. Some of the military élite, the leaders of some interest groups and a part of the first provisional government sought the rapid establishment of a presidentialist democratic regime immediately following the convocation of elections.

The disagreements concerning the nature of decolonization, which was the initial driving force behind the conflict between the captains who had led the coup and General Spinola and other conservative generals, led to the emergence of the Armed Forces Movement as a political force. This subsequently opened a space for social and political mobilization that exacerbated the crisis of the state, and which can perhaps explain why the moderate élites were incapable of directing, ‘from above’, the rapid institutionalization of democracy. Many analyses of the transition rightly emphasize the powerful ‘revitalization of civil society’ as a factor leading to the process of radicalization. As Schmitter notes, ‘Portugal experienced one of the most intense and widespread

mobilization experiences of any of the neo-democracies’. It is important to note, however, that this mobilization developed in parallel with and in the presence of this protective cover; indeed, it is difficult to imagine this mobilization developing otherwise.

Initiatives of symbolic rupture with the past began to evolve soon after April 1974, culminating in the rapid and multidirectional purges (saneamentos). Following a quick decision to remove the more visible members of the dictatorial political élite and some conservative military officers, the purge movement began to affect the civil service and the private sector. It became increasingly radical, affecting the lower ranks of the regime bureaucracy, albeit unevenly. There were immediate calls for the agents of the political police and of other repressive bodies to be brought to justice.

It was at this time that the parties that were to represent the right and centre-right, the Centro Democrático Social (CDS — Social Democratic Centre) and the Partido Popular Democrático (PPD — Popular Democratic Party) were formed. The formation and legalization of political parties to represent the electorate of the centre-right and right, the PPD and the CDS, pointed in this direction. A great effort was made to exclude from these parties any persons associated with the New State and to find leaders with democratic credentials. Indeed, the CDS, which integrated sectors of Portuguese society that espoused conservative authoritarian values, was on the verge of being declared illegal until the first elections for the Constituent Assembly on 25 April 1975.

The overthrow of General Spínola, along with the MFA’s shift to the left and the implementation of agrarian reforms and nationalization of large economic groups, were both symbols and motors of an ever-worsening state crisis that was sustaining powerful social movements. The MFA’s decision to respect the electoral calendar was a significant factor in the founding legitimization of the democratic regime, and the carrying out of these elections as scheduled greatly enhanced the position of the moderate political parties.

It is too simplistic to consider the ‘Hot Summer’ of 1975 simply as an attempt by the Partido Comunista Português (PCP — Portuguese Communist Party) to impose a new dictatorship with the support of the Soviet Union. Naturally, the democratic political élite made much of this argument in its founding discourse, but this does not provide a full explanation of events. The situation was more complex. Conflict was fed by the development of strong grassroots political organizations such as the workers’ commissions, the growing challenge posed by the extreme left during the crisis, and its influence within the military. At the same time extreme left-wing journalists ‘occupied’ the Catholic radio station, Rádio Renascença, and the newspaper República, which until then had been the mouthpiece of the moderate left, and houses, shops and factories were occupied throughout Lisbon. The importance of

internal divisions within the armed forces in driving these events forward means they cannot be explained as part of a ‘programmed conspiracy’. As one observer of the transition has noted, the crisis of the state created a ‘window of opportunity’ for the radicalization of social movements.\(^{18}\)

Portuguese society began to polarize, with the emergence of an anti-revolutionary movement in the north of the country. It was in this context of increasing mobilization, on 25 November 1975, that moderate MFA officers organized a successful counter-coup that toppled the radicals. The Partido Socialista (PS — Socialist Party) and the Partido Social Democrática (PSD — Social Democratic Party) backed the moderates, leading mobilizations in Lisbon and Oporto. In the provinces to the north of the Tagus River, the hierarchy of the Catholic Church and local notables supported parish-level mobilizations. As elements of the extreme right and right, military officers and civilians alike, began to mobilize, the anti-left offensive became violent. Attacks were made on the offices of the PCP, the extreme left and associated unions, and there emerged right-wing terrorist organizations, the Movimento Democrático para a Liberação de Portugal (MDLP — Democratic Movement for the Liberation of Portugal), and the Exército para a Liberação de Portugal (ELP — Army for the Liberation of Portugal).\(^{19}\)

In 1974–75 Portugal experienced significant foreign intervention not only in diplomatic terms, but also affecting the formation of political parties, unions and interest organizations, as well as shaping the anti-left strategy that evolved over the ‘Hot Summer’ of 1975. The Portuguese case was a divisive issue in international organizations, within the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the European Economic Community (EEC), affecting relations between these two organizations and the Socialist Bloc countries led by the Soviet Union. All the evidence makes it clear that in 1974–75 Portugal was an issue of ‘international relevance’.

Caught by surprise with the coup, the international community, and the United States in particular, focused on supporting democratic political forces of the centre left and right in the capital, as well as on intervening in the rapid process of decolonization, particularly in Angola.\(^{20}\) The same post-second world war methods deployed to deal with Italy were used in the Portuguese case. The moderate political parties were financed by the US administration, which together with the international organizations of the European ‘political families’ — these often mediating the US role — also supported the training of party cadres.\(^{21}\) The impact of foreign aid, however, was limited. It was


\(^{21}\) Walter C. Opello, Jr, ‘Portugal: A Case Study of International Determinants of Regime
drowned out by the powerful political and social mobilization led by the left, an economy strongly marked by a large nationalized sector, as well as capital flight and the actual flight of members of the economic elite from the country. It was thus domestic political factors that played a critical role in allowing the triumph of moderate civilian forces and the final withdrawal of the military from the political arena.

The nature of the transition, but especially the crisis of the state that it unleashed, is essential for explaining some of its more radical characteristics, as well as some of the attitudes with respect to the country’s authoritarian past during this period: both flowed together into a double legacy for the consolidation of democracy.22

Only a few months after the coup, Portuguese transitional justice expressed all the contradictory faces of an attempt to punish the authoritarian élites and the agents of and collaborators in the dictatorship’s repression.23 The second wave of score-settling reached the economic and entrepreneurial élites. Most of the real and symbolically punitive measures against the most visible and better-known collaborators took place between 1974 and 1976, before establishment of the new legitimated democracy. This was a period marked by the crisis of the state brought about by the activities of powerful social movements and military interventions that shaped social attitudes regarding the punishment of those associated with the old regime. This was a process in which the judiciary played almost no role.

The non-hierarchical nature of the coup, with the almost immediate intervention of the democratic élite and popular mobilization, accentuated both the real and the symbolic break with the past. The brief resistance offered by those forces most associated with the dictatorship’s repression, such as the political police and the Legião Portuguesa (LP — Portuguese Legion), with the imprisonment of many of the former organization’s members, was a significant element driving the political movement for their criminalization.

The first measures implemented by General Spínola’s Junta da Salvapação Nacional (JSN — National Salvation Junta), which was in full accordance with the MFA programme, provided for a minimal and swift purge of the armed

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23 We are dealing here with the first measures that were mainly concerned with the past: with ‘the political decisions that were taken immediately following the transition and which were directed at individuals who were responsible for decisions made or implemented under the old regime’. See Jon Elster, ‘Coming to Terms with the Past: A Framework for the Study of Justice in the Transition to Democracy’, Archives Européennes de Sociologie 39(1), 14; and Jon Elster, Closing the Books, op. cit.
forces. Members of the former regime who wished to join Marcelo Caetano were immediately deported to Madeira, from where they almost immediately continued on to exile in Brazil. In this way, the new government avoided having to respond to popular demands that the former leaders face criminal trials in Portugal. Both the political police and the anti-communist LP, which had attempted to resist the April coup, were immediately disarmed, some of their leaders being placed in custody. The single party and the official youth organization were, along with many of the regime’s institutions, closed down. The MFA proposed that 60 generals, most of whom had publicly declared their support for Marcelo Caetano on the eve of his overthrow, should be placed on the reserve.

The main demand, which was nearly unanimous, was to ensure criminal trials of elements of the political police. These demands were made as a consequence of the military coup’s own dynamics and the surrounding of the political police headquarters in Lisbon, which resulted in the surrender and arrest of many of the agents who had been in the building. Some attempts made were to ensure the survival of the political police in the colonies, given the collaboration between them and the armed forces; however, the organization was eventually abolished. Many former agents remained prisoners, whilst many others fled the country within days of the coup.24

It did not take long for the new authorities to set up the Comissão de Extinção da PIDE-DGS, MP e LP (CEPML — Commission for the Abolition of the Political Police, Portuguese Legion and Portuguese Youth), which was led by military officers.25 This body immediately began arresting people who had acted as informants for the previous regime’s political police. The life of this commission was agitated. There were frequent denunciations of political manipulation by extreme left-wing groups and the PCP. The role of the commission was to prepare criminal proceedings for the trial of former police agents and to co-operate with other purge institutions, given its monopolistic access to the approximately 3 million files kept on individual citizens. In July 1975, Constitutional Law 8/75 provided for the trial before a military tribunal of members of the political police and government officials directly responsible for repression, on the basis of a ‘revolutionary legitimacy’ referred to in the preamble. The law also provided for sentences of from 2 to 12 years, and no statute of limitations was established for criminal proceedings.26

24 In the colonies, the political police remained active for a few weeks immediately following the coup, as the military had hoped that the service could be integrated into a military intelligence police. However, not even the colonial political police could escape the abolition of their service. 25 See Filipa Raimundo, ‘The Double Face of Heroes. Transitional Justice and the Political Police (PIDE/DGS) in Portugal’s Democratization, 1974–1976’, MA dissertation in comparative politics, Institute of Social Sciences, University of Lisbon, 2007. 26 Artur Costa, ‘O Julgamento da PIDE-DGS e o Direito (Transitório) à Memória’, in Iva Delgado, Manuel Lofo, António Cluny, Carlos Pacheco and Ricardo Monteiro (eds), De Pinochet a Timor Lorosae: Impunidade e Direito à Memória (Lisbon 2000), 39–53; Raimundo, ‘The Double Face’, op. cit.
The first laws promulgated by the JSN legitimized the dismissal of the president and cabinet ministers, as well as of the leaders of the single party and the LP. The Movimento Democrático Português (MDP — Portuguese Democratic Movement), a front organization linked to the PCP, took over local posts at the city council level and removed former regime leaders from their posts. Several of the authoritarian regime’s union organizations (sindicatos nacionais) were taken over by the workers, who removed the former leaders from their positions.

The first public statements by left-wing political parties were generally quite cautious regarding the issue of purges. The PS and the PCP both issued moderate statements. The first purges were spontaneous, with strikers calling for purges within businesses. Some professors and bureaucrats in the universities of Lisbon and Coimbra who had collaborated with the former regime were denied access to their faculties by student associations.

In response to these movements, the provisional government promulgated the first regulations on public administration purges. Two months after the fall of the old regime, the Comissão Inter-Ministerial de Saneamento e Reclassificação (CIMSR — Inter-ministerial Purge and Reclassification Commission) was created. It answered directly to the Council of Ministers and was charged with co-ordinating existing purge commissions or with creating new ones to cover all the ministries. Decree Law 277, dated 25 June 1974, charged it with the scrutiny of behaviour that ‘contradicted the post-25 April 1974 established order’. These commissions remained active until 1976 and the legislation governing them was revised several times in order to keep up with the radicalization of the political situation. Decree Law 123 of 11 March 1975 already referred to the former regime as a ‘fascist regime’ and subjected civil servants to purges for acts committed during the dictatorship. That same month, when General Spínola fled the country, a generalized anti-capitalist sentiment emerged, resulting in a renewed wave of purges.

In February 1975 the official reports on the purge process stated that approximately 12,000 people had been either removed from their posts or suspended, either legally or illegally, if we include ministries, the armed forces, the former corporatist apparatus and the public sector of the economy. It is estimated that between March and November 1975 the number of removals and suspensions must have increased significantly.

Various organizations were involved in the purge process. Aside from the measures adopted by the JSN and the MFA immediately after the coup, the PCP and the small but influential parties of the extreme left were the main actors involved. Purge movements in the private sector and even in the government bureaucracy, however, often escaped political party control. The establishment of Comissões de Saneamento (Purge Commissions) within the public

27 Diário do Governo, 1 (146), 744.
28 Diário do Governo, 1 (59), 375.
29 O Século, 27 February 1975.
administration was approved by the first provisional governments, which included representatives of the PCP, PS and PSD. These Commissions sought to establish a legal framework for many of the dismissals that were taking place as a result of the purges (Table 1).

The Comissões de Trabalhadores (Workers’ Commissions) often called for purges. These were established within businesses independently of the unions, and the PCP shared control of these bodies with the parties of the extreme left. These commissions implemented the great majority of ‘wild’ purges, which the PCP often did not control.

Generally speaking, the purge process was not governed by a clear strategy and revealed no coherent pattern, varying greatly from sector to sector. The concept of ‘collaborator’ also shifted during the pre-constitutional period. In 1974, the first purges were limited by a strict concept of ‘collaborationists’. By 1975, however, various types of authoritarian attitudes amongst the industrial and entrepreneurial élite were considered to be associated with the former regime.

For obvious reasons, the first institution to undergo a purge process was the military. Immediately after the coup, the MFA handed General Spínola the names of the 60 generals who had pledged their allegiance to the authoritarian regime, and who were subsequently placed on the reserve by the JSN. The purge of the armed forces was part of the political programme of the MFA and, against the wishes of General Spínola, the process widened to affect a greater number of officers. The first list was composed of persons deemed to have given political support to Marcelo Caetano during a political act in March 1974, on the eve of the coup, against the clandestine MFA as well as generals Spínola and Costa Gomes.

In the months that followed the 1974 coup, special military commissions administered the purges demanded by the MFA. By October 1974, 103 navy officers had been removed from active service and placed on the reserve.30 By

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30 O Século, 1 October 1974. Dinis de Almeida, who was at that time an important figure in the MFA’s extreme-left, divided the purges into four periods. General Spínola and the MFA led the first series of purges. The second, which was based on the principle of ‘incompetence’, was much slower and more complex. The third, which took place during the spring and summer of 1975, involved the removal of right-wing officers. The fourth and final series of purges took place after 25 November 1975, when left-wing officers were removed. See Dinis de Almeida, Ascenção, Apogeu e Queda do MFA (Lisbon 1978), 39–43.
the end of the year, 300 officers of all ranks and from all three services had been removed from active duty. Incompetence became the official criterion for removal, as it became impossible to sustain political criteria such as ‘collaboration with the old regime’, given that the whole defence establishment had collaborated with the New State during the colonial war.

When General Spinola went into exile after the attempted coup of March 1975, the purge movement was reinforced, and the majority of the officers working with him were removed from their posts. The purges also affected the Guarda Nacional Republicana (GNR — National Republican Guard), a militarized police body. The Council of the Revolution, the MFA’s supreme body, issued Decree Law 147C of 21 March 1975, which stated that any officers who did not ‘obey the principles espoused by the MFA’ would be placed in the reserve.31

With the consolidation of democracy at the beginning of the 1980s, and as a result of the profusion of military movements during the transitional period, more officers were removed from the active list or subjected to processes that removed them from the armed forces and forced them into exile. Following the victory of the moderates within the MFA, those officers who had been associated with revolutionary left-wing movements or with the Communist Party were dismissed. Sympathizers of these parties within the armed forces were removed from their posts, while others went into exile in Angola and Mozambique, by that time governed by socialist regimes. After the dissolution of the Council of the Revolution, some MFA leaders were also forced to leave the armed forces, although many were reintegrated, only to be immediately placed on the reserve as a consequence of extremely drawn-out judicial processes that continued into the 1990s.

The military was the institution where a break with the past was clearest.32 A new generation quickly rose to the top ranks of the forces, as the old élite associated with the New State had been forced to retire. The institutionalization of democracy in Portugal therefore entailed an important change in the life of military officers, and it was here that the impact of the fall of the regime was most sharply felt.

The first legislation stated that civil servants could be purged for three reasons: non-democratic behaviour in the course of duty after the coup; inability to adapt to the new democratic regime; and incompetence. The minimum punishment was to be transferred to another post, while the maximum was dismissal.33 Maximum penalties were applied according to priorities defined a little later by the government: membership of the dictatorship’s governmental élite; political police collaborators; leading members of either the MP, the LP or the single party; and the heads of the dictatorship’s censorship board.34

33 There were four different degrees of punishment: transfer to other duties at either the same or a lower grade; suspension for up to three years; compulsory retirement; and dismissal.
The purge process was directed by the various commissions and presented to the CIMSR, which ratified the penalty to be applied, in each case implemented by the head of the relevant ministry. The protests of the trade unions and members of the commissions against the indecision and the slow pace of the bureaucracy led to the adoption of new legislation in March 1975. This new law provided for purges based on individual political behaviour before the fall of the authoritarian regime.

It is difficult to determine how the purges affected the state bureaucracy on a quantitative level. The process evolved differently from ministry to ministry, depending on the level of pressure from the trade unions and the limits imposed by the legislation. At the end of 1974, eight months after the coup, about 4300 public servants had been subjected to a purge process. According to the global analysis made by the commission that co-ordinated the process, the action of the various ministerial commissions was very uneven, depending on the party to which the minister belonged and the degree of trade union and social movement pressure (Table 2).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ministry</th>
<th>Total of civil servants</th>
<th>Number of prosecutions instituted by the initiative of purge commissions</th>
<th>Number of people implicated</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Presidency of the Council of Ministers</td>
<td>1,470</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>interterritorial Co-ordination</td>
<td>2,000</td>
<td>205</td>
<td>278</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Internal Affairs</td>
<td>7,000</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>737</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Justice</td>
<td>5,000</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economy</td>
<td>8,000</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>891</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finance</td>
<td>12,000</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>191</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foreign Affairs</td>
<td>523</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>87</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Environment</td>
<td>80,000</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>303</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education and Culture</td>
<td>65,000</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>1,029</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Labour</td>
<td>5,270</td>
<td>237</td>
<td>317</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social Affairs</td>
<td>27,171</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>219</td>
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<tr>
<td>Information</td>
<td>610</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>208,044</td>
<td>954</td>
<td>4,177</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Approximate numbers.
* Estimated numbers from CIR, with possible errors or omissions.
* Does not include salaried employees and locally hired people.


35 Artur Mauricio and Castelo Branco Chaves, Saneamento na Função Pública (Lisbon 1975), 90. See also O Século, 27 February 1975.
One of the least affected ministries was the Ministry of Justice, particularly magistrates and the political courts of the dictatorship, the ‘plenary courts’. A good part of the moderate left élite associated with the PS was made up of lawyers who had participated in the political trials of the New State, either as the accused or as defence lawyers, particularly for communist activists. At the same time, the Salazarist élite had a large component of law professors, and the regime had always obsessively attempted to legitimate its acts in juridical terms. Both these elements would lead one to believe that pressure to criminally try the legal élite could be high, but this was not the case. Institutional factors and the moderation of socialist leaders were important factors counteracting this impetus to purge the legal profession and the Ministry of Justice. Additional obstacles limited the purge of magistrates, such as the autonomy of the judiciary and the fact that the first ministers did not promote purges. In response to public criticism, the Secretary of the Purge Commission of the Ministry of Justice recognized that it was not ‘necessary or viable to undertake deeper purges at this point’.

Out of a body of 500 magistrates, 42 judges were submitted to a purge process in 1974–75, most of them for participating in political courts or holding government posts or posts within censorship bodies. Two years later, some of the best-known judges that had been dismissed or forcibly retired were re-integrated by the Comissão de Análise de Recursos de Saneamentos e de Reclassificação (CARSR — Commission for the Assessment of Purge Appeals and Reclassifications). Two judges who went through this process were, despite protests from the moderate parliamentary left, appointed to the Supreme Court of Justice.

The purges undertaken in the Ministry of Labour were more complex, far-reaching and radical. The new ministry succeeded the old Ministry of Corporations and Welfare, which had overseen the gigantic corporatist apparatus of the old regime. A large number of the ‘wild’ purges were ‘legalized’ by the inclusion in the purge law not only of people who had maintained a formal relationship with the PIDE-DGS but also all the people who had in one way or another collaborated with the political police. In addition, nationalization and the intervention of the state in various private enterprises meant that the majority of forced removals took place in this sector, which was also the most marked by the anti-capitalism of the social movements.

Purges in the Ministry of Education, and throughout the education system as a whole, were also high, particularly in the universities. Famous university students were among those who were dismissed. The purge of the Ministry of Environment was also more complex, because it was involved in the management of the natural resources of the country.

37 A Capital, 19 April 1975.
38 There were very few purges in bodies that were responsible to the Ministry of Justice: 22 Judicial Police officers, 16 registrars and notaries and 4 prison directors were removed from their positions: A Capital, 19 April 1975.
39 See the speech delivered by the Socialist Party deputy Raul Rego, which was published in A Luta on 9 February 1977.
professors and schoolteachers, as well as writers, formed a part of the purge commission for this sector.\textsuperscript{40} The JSN removed all university deans and directors of faculties from their posts, and various high-ranking members of the Ministry were transferred. In the secondary schools, the more radical actions by the student movement forced the military to intervene to protect the accused. It was in the universities, however, that both legal and ‘wild’ purges were most thorough, given the very strong pressure exerted by the student movement.\textsuperscript{41} Some members of the commissions quickly resigned in protest against the ‘wild’ purges, which were undertaken sometimes in the absence of any legal proceedings.

Students would simply deny some professors entry to the university following assembly votes, although only a small minority of those ‘condemned’ were ever submitted to legal purge proceedings by the purge commission of the Ministry of Education. The same applied to some schoolteachers suspected of collaborating with the political police. The most radical of the ‘wild’ purges took place in the Faculty of Law of the University of Lisbon, where an assembly dominated by a Maoist party decided to purge some members of the Council of State and leaders of the conservative parties, against the will of PCP students.

The repression of the pro-democratic student movement in the final years of the dictatorship, as well as the authoritarian behaviour of many professors, explains some of these ‘wild’ purges. Legal purge proceedings against professors and education workers were more solidly based on two criteria: holding high-level posts under the dictatorship, or collaboration with repression by the political police by denouncing students and opposition professors. As in the Ministry of Labour, the latter category was the most sought after, and purges affected people in the lower ranks who gave information to the PIDE-DGS.

Some professors affected by the purges went into other professional activities and others emigrated to Brazil. When the government introduced the \textit{numerus clausus}, thereby conditioning access to the state university system, some of the professors who had been removed from their posts in 1974 became involved in the creation of private universities, although a large majority were later reintegrated into the state system.

Within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the purge process was limited to a few members of the diplomatic corps who had had government posts under the dictatorship. When he was nominated Minister of Foreign Affairs, Mário Soares merely transferred some ambassadors, and the purge commission, although fully constituted, worked only in some consulates where collaboration

\textsuperscript{40} For example, this was true in the case of Teixeira Ribeiro, a professor at the University of Coimbra who was to become Vasco Gonçalves’s deputy prime minister, and the writer and schoolteacher Mário Dionísio.

\textsuperscript{41} For some examples, see P. José Geraldes Freire, \textit{Processo de Saneamento. Acusação, Defesa, Depoimentos} (Coimbra 1976); and Augusto Lopes Cardoso, \textit{As “Monstruosidades vulgares” ou elementos para a História dos “saneamentos” ou os incríveis casos de um Magistrado e de dois professores catedráticos} (Braga 1977).
with the political police had been most notable. This was the case in Brazil and France, for example, where the consulates had been involved in controlling the activities of political exiles in countries with large Portuguese immigrant communities.

In total, purges within the state apparatus were uneven and limited. Where strong trade union and worker commission pressure was exerted, as in the ministries of Labour and Education, forced removals were more frequent. Indeed, while reports indicate that most of the people purged belonged to the higher levels of the administration, in these cases lower-ranking civil servants were also affected, particularly for collaboration with the political police. Long delays in purge proceedings, however, reduced the overall scope of the process and made it possible to undertake the rapid reintegration of various people a few years later. Nonetheless, important changes did occur at the top levels of the state administration. While many were reintegrated between 1976 and 1980, the great majority never regained the strategic posts they had previously held.

During the first two years of the transition, the economic élite was hard hit by the process of nationalization and state intervention, as well as by the flight of industrialists and entrepreneurs from the country. Despite attempts to reach an understanding between General Spinola and the leaders of the main economic groups, strike movements and a strong impetus towards state intervention led to the first wave of self-exiles. Some of the most important illegal purge processes were also initiated against members of the economic élite, visibly frightening them. Already in May 1974, the purge of this élite was the third demand of a group of 149 labour conflicts, and it remained on the top of the list of demands made by workers and strikers throughout the following year.

It was only at the beginning of 1976, with Decree Law 52 of 21 January, that two purge commissions were given legal status and formal competence to deal with the banking and insurance sectors, which had by then been nationalized. These commissions were subordinated to the commission governing purges in the public sector as a whole. Its main role at this point was to re-integrate those who had been subjected to the ‘wild’ purges without respect for the basic principles of due process.

The exodus of important members of the economic élite became a common occurrence in 1975, as did the nomination of new managers for the businesses where the state had intervened. The ‘wild’ purges were concentrated in the large enterprises in the industrial area around Lisbon and in the banking and insurance sectors. In the business community, the dynamic overtook any desire to punish any individual’s collaboration with either political repression or New State institutions, and it became an integral part of a wave of increasingly

43 Fátima Patriarca, ‘A Revolução e a Questão Social: Que Justiça Social?’, in Fernando Rosas (ed.), Portugal e a Transição para a Democracia (Lisbon 1999), 141.
44 Diário do Governo, 1 (17), 112–3.
anti-capitalist social demands that railed against the authoritarian behaviour of the business and land-owning élite. In the north of the country there were fewer ‘wild’ purges, because of the relative weakness of the unions and the workers commissions.45

The nationalization strategy aimed to dismantle the large economic groups and to give the state control over the main sectors of the Portuguese economy. Apart from direct nationalization, the state indirectly controlled various businesses for a fixed period. The 1976 Constitution confirmed the nationalization process but reduced the level of intervention. A study allows one to conclude that 19 per cent of industrialists abandoned their posts (2 per cent were purged), and that the purges essentially affected the industrial area in Lisbon and Setúbal, hardly affecting the northern textile sector.46 Brazil was the preferred exile destination, although many returned to Portugal between 1976 and 1980. When Mário Soares, as prime minister of the first constitutional government, visited Brazil in 1976, he called for the return of the members of the economic élite who had fled the country.

Thus, the wave of nationalization, purges and forced retirements of the pre-constitutional period profoundly affected the entrepreneurial sector. Most of its members were reintegrated between 1976 and 1980, but nationalization caused long-lasting changes in the Portuguese economic system, a key legacy of the transition to democracy.

The relationship between the state, the economic élite and the media underwent a profound transformation.47 The administrative and management bodies of radio and television stations, as well as of the main newspapers, were removed from their posts. Only a few directors of privately owned newspapers, already in the hands of the opposition under the old regime, were able to hang on to their posts. While the first purges were driven by the military, the main purge agents in this sector were journalists and typographers linked to the PCP and other extreme-left organizations, which maintained this position of dominance until 25 November 1975.

The censorship services were purged and dissolved. The official dictatorial press had had a limited circulation, circumscribed to members of the state bureaucracy for the most part. The newspaper of the single party, artificially sustained through an official subscription campaign, disappeared immediately after the occupation of its headquarters. The most important proceedings took place against non-official newspapers, where journalists and typographers linked to the left-wing parties controlled the purges.

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45 Muñoz, op. cit.
46 Harry Makler, 'The Consequences of the Survival and Revival of the Industrial Bourgeoisie', in Lawrence Graham and Douglas L. Wheeler (eds), In Search of Modern Portugal: The Revolution and its Consequences (Madison 1983), 251–83. See also Filipe S. Fernandes and Hermínio Santos, Excomungados de Abril. Os empresários na Revolução (Lisbon 2005); and some interviews in Leonor Xavier, Portugal Tempo de Paixão (Lisbon 2000).
The media as a whole suffered profound changes during the transition process. The political battle for control over the media had a great impact. The occupation of the Catholic Church radio station, Radio Renascença, by its own journalists and the self-management system instituted thereafter polarized public opinion. This radio station became an instrument of the extreme left in 1975, until its powerful transmitters were destroyed on the instructions of the military and the station returned to the Church.

The newspaper República met with a similar fate. Of all the daily publications, it was the only pro-democratic one to continue publishing throughout the duration of New State. This paper supported the PS and became self-managed after its directors resigned in 1975, when it became a mouthpiece for the revolutionary left until its old directors were restored to their previous position in 1976. While the communists were not responsible for any of these events, the moderate left associated with the PS made the ‘República case’ one of their most successful ‘anti-totalitarian’ campaigns. They succeeded in associating the ‘República case’ with the threat of a PCP takeover of power.

After the nationalization of the various economic groups that had controlled a substantial part of the print media, most of the press came under state control. Later, during the peak of the process of political radicalization, new newspapers emerged that were supported by the moderate left and the parties of the right, which re-employed some of the previously purged journalists. Many of these new newspapers relied on financial support from the Western democracies.

In 1974–75 various civic and state mobilization initiatives were promoted to denounce the authoritarian legacy and to ‘democratize’ certain sections of Portuguese society. Such was the nature of the Campanhas de Dinamização Cultural (CDC — Cultural Action Campaigns) that were developed by the MFA in collaboration with left-wing civilians and parts of the ‘Serviço Cívico Estudantil’ (SCE — Student Civic Service). The government also created the Black Book Commission on Fascism, which was responsible to the presidency of the Council of Ministers and which was composed of socialist and left-republican intellectuals and politicians. With access to all of the dictatorship’s archives, this Commission published dozens of books containing primary documentation, which, amongst other issues, denounced the regime’s repression, the treatment of political prisoners, censorship and the collaboration between economic groups and the political police. When it was dissolved in 1991 it was supposed to lead to the creation of a ‘museum of resistance’, a project that has yet to be realized. Other initiatives that were more emblematic of the 1974–75 period, but were associated with the political parties as well as civil society and popular organizations, were, for example, the creation of the ‘Tribunal Popular Humberto Delgado’ (Humberto Delgado Popular Tribunal).

The CDCs were intended to ‘democratize’ the rural world. While established by the MFA, the campaigns were driven by left-wing intellectuals and communists, who designed cultural initiatives that denounced the repression of the past and promoted civic participation. They were confronted by the resistance
of conservatives in the north and criticism from the moderate parties, both of which groups believed that these campaigns were an attempt by the military to create its own propaganda department. Consequently, the campaigns were constantly interrupted in the central and northern districts before they were finally abolished following the events of 25 November 1975 and the dissolution of the PCP-dominated Fifth Division.

The SCE was a product of two interrelated factors: the university system’s lack of capacity to accept all the candidates for higher education produced by a rapidly expanding secondary school system; and an ideological climate that promoted contact between students and ‘the people’. For one academic year before entering university, students were encouraged to work on literacy and other similar projects in local communities. One of the projects they were involved in was the collection of ethnographic material on popular memory. This material was intended to serve as the basis for a museum exhibiting oral and material memories of the popular resistance of the ‘peasants and the labourers’ to the New State.48

Both the SCE and the CDCs met with resistance (albeit for different reasons), particularly in the north of the country, where conservative notables and priests were particularly suspicious of left-wing initiatives, and where the urban middle classes feared the consequences of students escaping the control of the family. The CDCs were closed down in 1975, with the Education Ministry abolishing the SCE shortly thereafter.

The Humberto Delgado Popular Tribunal was established to examine the regime’s most notorious crime: in 1965 the PIDE had assassinated the dissident general Humberto Delgado near the Spanish town of Badajoz. Delgado had stood against Salazar’s candidate in the 1958 presidential elections, afterwards fleeing into exile. The dictatorship consistently denied any involvement in the general’s murder, while the family’s first lawyer was one of the regime’s leading opponents, Mário Soares. Established after the transition, the tribunal sought to mobilize public opinion to call for the conviction of those former PIDE agents who had committed the crime and who had since fled justice. In the end, those responsible for the assassination were tried and convicted in absentia.

The Constituent Assembly discussed a wide range of proposals that were to lead to the criminalization of both the authoritarian élite and the dictatorship’s agents of repression. With the exception of the temporary measures introduced to ensure the condemnation of the PIDE agents responsible for Delgado’s assassination, in terms of punitive measures against the old regime, the only legal legacy of the transition was the introduction in the 1976 Constitution of a clause prohibiting parties with a ‘fascist ideology’. This was retained after

subsequent constitutional revisions and in the 1990s, despite criticisms regarding its usefulness, it was not only ratified by the parliament but was even used against a group of the extreme right.

As we have seen above, the military, political, administrative and economic élite were all deeply affected, albeit to different extents, by the measures introduced during the first two years of the transition to punish them for their collaboration with the previous regime (see Table 3).

As Table 2 shows, this is a form of what Jon Elster calls ‘immediate transitional justice’, which happens very quickly during the two transitional phases. As in other European countries, such as France and Italy, democratic consolidation marked the beginning of the process of rehabilitation. Only the compensation of the ‘anti-fascists’ will be discussed below, as the legacy of the colonial war and subsequent decolonization was to drag on for the next 30 years.

In 1976 the moderate élite that dominated the period of consolidation inherited a complex situation. The military intervention of 25 November 1975 marked the beginning of the process of democratic institutionalization, although that process remained under the tutelage of the Council of the Revolution until 1982. In the economic sphere, a heavily nationalized sector and extensive state interventionism, along with the introduction of severe austerity measures following the first Portuguese agreement with the International Monetary Fund (IMF), became symbols of recession and resulted in a drastic reduction in real salaries. In the social arena, the return of hundreds of thousands of colonial refugees as a result of the decolonization process brought problems. Some extreme right-wing terrorist actions continued briefly — a legacy of the ‘Hot Summer’ of 1975. This was soon to be joined by extreme left-wing terrorist activity.

The official discourse of the first two constitutional governments led by the prime minister, Mário Soares, and by the first democratically elected president, Ramalho Eanes, favoured ‘reconciliation’ and ‘pacification’.

Under pressure from parties on the right and centre-right, the purges were soon brought to an end and their role re-evaluated in light of the claim that they were an excess of the early transitional period. At the same time, a number of communists, as well as left-wing civilians and military figures, were

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49 Elster, Closing the Books, op. cit., 75.
removed from office. Many members of extreme-left parties and the PCP were dismissed from their positions within the civil service and state-owned companies. Soldiers associated with the former prime minister, Vasco Gonçalves, and the leader of the MFA’s militant faction, Otelo Saraiva do Carvalho, were dismissed from the armed forces.

The extreme right-wing terrorism of the MDLP and ELP was largely carried out by military officers — both active and retired. The actions of these groups came to an end a few years later, and they were soon to dissolve, following General Spínola’s return from exile. Whilst some of their members were jailed, the majority of cases dragged on for years and resulted in vendettas, given their extensive links with moderate elements during the ‘Hot Summer’ of 1975 and the promises made to them that their crimes would be ‘forgotten’. The repression of the extreme left-wing terrorist group, the Popular Forces of 25 April (FP-25), which involved the 25 April coup’s operational chief and leader of the revolutionary left, Otelo Saraiva do Carvalho, was a much more complex affair that dragged on until the turn of the century.

Despite this outburst of violence, the climate of political reconciliation predominated in the last years of the 1970s, shaping the way in which the government dealt with the legacy of the dictatorship. This was particularly true of the trial of members of the former regime’s political police, the PIDE-DGS. Following the so-called ‘PIDE hunt’, in which those who had not fled the country were tracked down, there followed a two-year period during which PIDE-DGS agents awaited trial and punishment, either in protective custody or on conditional bail. Their trials were conducted according to the new post-revolutionary political ethos and, as a result, those who had not taken advantage of their bail to flee the country received only light sentences from the military tribunals (normally they were sentenced to time already served). Those who had good military active service reports from the colonial war period received especially benevolent treatment. Although there were public demonstrations and criticism of the sentences meted out, they did serve as notice that judicial legality and the rule of law had been re-established following the ‘excesses’ of the turbulent years 1974–75. The two years that had passed since then had seen a significant diminution of 1974’s revolutionary ‘emotions’, and the ruling political élite made it clear that they favoured continuing with institutional demobilization.

Between 1976 and the early-1980s, steps were taken to reintegrate those who had been victims of the purges.50 New legislation was passed and measures were quickly adopted to normalize the situation in the economic arena, where the ‘wild’ purges had been most severe. Soon after the introduction of these new laws, the Council of the Revolution ordered ‘all officials of the armed forces who had been assigned to the purge commissions in private

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50 This section owes much to Maria Inácia Rezola, who provided me with material concerning the Council of the Revolution and the purges. For more on this, see her Os Militares na Revolução de Abril (Lisbon 2006).
enterprises' to return to their barracks. The government followed this up with a series of measures designed to facilitate the return of exiles and business administrators who had been forced out by the purges. Decree Law 471 of 14 June 1976 declared that the ideologically motivated purges realized by workers in the private and public sectors between 1974 and 1976, and 'which had not observed' the laws that were then in force, were legally null and void.

Taking advantage of the new situation, the victims of the purges organized themselves into the Movimento Pró-reintegração dos Despedidos sem Justa Causa (MPDJC — Movement for the Reintegration of the Wrongly Dismissed), which could count on the new private newspapers to fight their corner. The trade union movement protested against the reintegration of those who had been purged by holding strikes and even some sporadic sit-ins. These actions, which affected mainly the recently nationalized state enterprises and the civil service, were largely unsuccessful.

The purge commissions in the ministries ceased to operate in 1976, and the Council of the Revolution, which took on the role of these commissions as well as the leadership of the CEPML, reinforced legal mechanisms to ensure that a process of rehabilitation took place. A moderate member of the Council of the Revolution, Captain Sousa e Castro, was given responsibility for the entire process. The CARSR was then created under the auspices of the Council of the Revolution and continued in operation until the mid-1980s, rehabilitating the vast majority of appellants who came before it. This commission was composed of legally qualified military officials and civilians who had no links with the dictatorship. According to a report into its activities, the commission expressed the view that ‘it is necessary to repair the damage that was done’ during the 1974–75 period, when many of the purges were ‘merely arbitrary’. Most of those who had been dismissed during the purges had their punishment altered to compulsory retirement. The remainder often received a payment in lieu of lost earnings and restoration of their seniority for the purpose of calculating retirement pension entitlements. In some cases in which trade union or student resistance to the reintegration was particularly vociferous, those who were to be reintegrated were simply transferred to other institutions, or remained at home until emotions calmed down before returning to their posts. In some universities reintegration of those who had been purged did not begin until the early-1980s. One case, that of Veiga Simão, former Education Minister under Caetano, was decided by the Council of the Revolution itself; however, the great majority were left to Sousa e Castro and his CEPML.

51 Council of the Revolution, Minutes of a meeting dated 11 December 1975, Annexes T and P, Arquivo Nacional Torre do Tombo (ANTT). Sousa e Castro had already been nominated to take control of the purges, but he took office only after the events of 25 November 1975. See Council of the Revolution, Minutes of a meeting dated 31 October 1975, ANTT.
52 Diário do Governo, 1 (138), 1332.
53 From the Jornal Novo to the Socialist Party’s own A Luta.
Between 1976 and 1978 this commission reassessed 3351 processes within the various government ministries and nationalized industries, most of which concerned officials of the previous regime’s political police. In the case of PIDE-DGS agents, the CEPML followed the precedent established by the military tribunals. These tribunals had heard the cases against political police agents, and had decided that ‘the fact that those being tried were former agents of the PIDE-DGS is irrelevant because it was not illegal in the past to be a member of the political police’. This principle restored to them their rights as public employees, but only if they had not ‘taken part in illegal activities’.

With the abolition of the Council of the Revolution, many of the outstanding appeals were transferred to the administrative courts, while the CEPML became little more than a document archive that was responsible to parliament. Parliamentary debates concerning the future of the archive were often heated and passionate, with some parties, particularly the CDS, calling for their destruction. Their incorporation into the national archive and consequent limited release to the public was a controversial victory for historians and left-wing parties.

An official exhibition on the twentieth century in Portugal was inaugurated in November 1999, with the sponsorship of the Presidency and the government, to celebrate 25 years of Portuguese democracy. It was aimed at the public at large and at students. Thousands of Portuguese travelled through the dark passages of Salazarism and through the torture chambers of the political police and corridors lined with photographs of political prisoners, while opposition figures and the pro-democratic press were celebrated. There was a threatening corridor dedicated to the colonial war, which ended in a well-lit area celebrating the fall of the dictatorship. Significantly, the exhibition ended where democracy began. The turbulent period of the first years of the transition were omitted, represented symbolically by thematic panels that portrayed the process of social and political change that had taken place in the 25 years since the fall of the Salazar regime.

It would have been very hard for an official exhibition to deal with the transitional period, given the complex legacy of the first two years of the transition. According to the official discourse of the PS, led by Mário Soares, and the democratic parties of the centre-right, Portuguese democracy was shaped by a ‘double legacy’: the authoritarianism of the right under the New State, and the authoritarian threat of the extreme left of 1974–1975.

The impact of the return to Portugal of right-wing exiles, of press campaigns in favour of those who had been expropriated in 1974–1975 and of the search for some anticommunist ‘military heroes’ was hardly noticeable. The process of decolonization, aggravated by the inability to mobilize those returning from Africa, marked the end of an era for the Portuguese radical right.

The relatively peaceful process of reintegrating the returning colonists was not merely a consequence of the ‘quiet habits’ ascribed to the Portuguese, or of

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55 Ibid.
state support. It was also a product of the nature of the white community in
Africa, such as its relatively recent settlement in the colonies and the concomi-
tant maintenance of family ties in Portugal.56 Emigration to other countries,
such as South Africa, also diminished the numbers returning and the shock of
social absorption.

By the end of the 1970s, the situation no longer favoured the political recon-
version of the ‘barons’ of the dictatorship and of military figures with populist
tendencies, who hoped to make political capital of involvement in anticommu-
nist action in the mid 1970s.

The abolition of punitive legislation affecting the dictatorial élite and the
process of democratic consolidation encouraged some of the leading figures of
the old regime to return to Portugal. The last president of the New State,
Admiral Américo Tomás, who maintained a ‘political silence’ until his death,
as well as some former ministers returned. Marcelo Caetano refused to return
from Brazil, where he died in 1980. None of those returning, however, wanted
to associate themselves with a possible rebirth of the radical right, and few of
them joined the democratic parties. Some exceptions confirm the rule: Adriano
Moreira, former Minister for the Colonies, developed a political career under
the new democracy. He became a deputy and the Secretary General of the CDS
for a short period of time. Among the Caetano ministerial élite there were a
few that became involved in politics again, but the number is insignificant.
Veiga Simão, who designed the policy to modernize the school system shortly
before the fall of the regime, offers one of the rare examples of a reactivated
political career.

By 1985, on the eve of Portugal’s accession to the EEC, the heritage of the
double legacy was practically extinct. There was no party of the right of
parliamentary or electoral significance that represented the old élite or acted as
a carrier of authoritarian values inherited from Salazarism. The legacy of state
socialism and military guardianship had also disappeared after successive
constitutional reforms.

The new democratic institutions associated themselves with the legacy of
political opposition to the dictatorship. The semi-presidential nature of the
political system, and the fact that first General Ramalho Eanes, and then two
presidents who had been active in the anti-Salazar struggle (Mário Soares and
Jorge Sampaio) have been important symbolically in reinforcing the anti-
dictatorial nature of the regime. During the first 30 years of democracy, succes-
bridge over the Tagus, which was quickly renamed Ponte 25 de Abril (25 April Bridge).

Attempts were made from the 1970s onwards to compensate those activists who had struggled against the dictatorship, although some of the proposals did not receive parliamentary approval.\(^5^7\) Members of the anti-Salazar opposition had to wait until 1997 and the introduction of the António Guterres’s Socialist Party government’s legislation that enabled them to seek compensation, in terms of social security and retirement pension entitlements, for the years they had remained clandestine or in exile.\(^5^8\) However, in order to qualify, the claimants must be able to provide evidence of their persecution from the records held in the PIDE archive, and this is not always easy.\(^5^9\)

Another aspect of the attempt to symbolically delegitimize the authoritarian past was the alteration of national holidays. The date of the republican revolution, 5 October 1910 (the Republic had never been abolished by the dictatorship), assumed greater significance, while the 28 May holiday, which celebrated the military coup of 1926, was replaced with a new holiday on 25 April celebrating the foundation of the new democratic regime.

In Portugal the creation of museums about repression and the dictatorship is notably absent. All such projects presented in the first two years of the transition were abandoned because of a lack of interest within civil society, including from political parties such as the PS or the PCP, or a lack of enthusiasm on the part of the state. A project to turn the Commission on the Black Book on the Fascist Regime into a Museum of the Resistance failed to garner the support of the centre-right government of Cavaco Silva in 1991. Some modest initiatives were undertaken by city councils run by PS–PCP coalitions, such as the Lisbon council in the 1990s. The so-called Museum of the Republic and Resistance is a case in point. It was only towards the end of the 1990s that private foundations were created with the explicit aim of consolidating the memory of resistance to Salazarism and the transition to democracy. Such is the Mário Soares Foundation, established after the former president retired. With the passage of time, the 25 April Association, which is organized by members of the MFA, has gradually developed an annual commemoration and has kept the memory alive of those who were involved in the coup that brought down the authoritarian regime.

As in other transitions to democracy, the fate of the defeated regime’s archives was a topic of heated debate. Given the nature of the fall of the regime, the military took possession of the PIDE-DGS archives, and these survived almost intact. More importantly, perhaps, the archives of Salazar himself

\(^{57}\) Diário de Notícias, 16 June 1976.

\(^{58}\) Law 20/97, 19 June 1997.

\(^{59}\) According to this law, the claimant must prove that their claim is related to time ‘spent, either within the country or abroad, during which they were victims of political persecution that impeded their ability to engage in normal professional activities and prevented their social insertion into the community because of their membership of a political group, or their participation in political activities destined to promote democracy’ at any time between 28 May 1926 and 25 April 1974.
were kept in the headquarters of the Presidency of the Council of Ministers when the dictator died in 1970. This archive, which had been meticulously maintained by Salazar, gives a unique account of 40 years of Portuguese political life. Both the PIDE-DGS and the Salazar archives have been deposited in the national archive, where, like all other New State documents, they are open to public inspection.

Important public debates about the archives began in the 1990s, when these were opened to the public. One such debate, provoked in 1996 by a former socialist minister who had been a victim of the PIDE-DGS, centred around return of letters, photographs and other materials apprehended by the political police to their original owners or their heirs. Although some defended this course of action during the parliamentary debates that ensued, the negative reaction of the majority of historians ensured that the archives remained in the national archive.60

There are occasional ‘eruptions of memory’ arising from unresolved cases, or from new revelations by former regime members. For example, in 1998 the leader of the PIDE unit responsible for Humberto Delgado’s assassination gave an interview to a Portuguese journalist in which he stated that he regularly travelled to Portugal, although he had been condemned, in absentia, to eight years’ imprisonment. He was soon found — in Spain, where he had been living under a false name. A Spanish court prevented the Portuguese authorities from extraditing him, however, and the court that had originally sentenced him was forced to admit that the statute of limitations applied, and that he was a free man.

The Portuguese case is a good illustration of the absence of any correlation between the nature of the authoritarian regime and the extent of retributive pressure during the transition process. It was the nature of the authoritarian regime’s downfall and the character of the ‘anti-authoritarian’ coalition during the first provisional governments that provoked the symbolic break with the past. The new authorities felt that it was ‘morally and politically desirable’ to replace and to punish some members of the previous élite and to dissolve the authoritarian institutions — particularly because the type of transition provided them with the political opportunity. The state crisis and the dynamics of the social movements in 1975 exceeded the political punishment of the authoritarian élite, provoking the greatest ‘fear’ of the twentieth century amongst the country’s social and economic élite.

If we compare the three southern European transitions of the 1970s, then, from the perspective of ‘transitional justice’, Portugal’s was the most radical. Transitional justice measures were absent in the Spanish case, principally because of the ‘pactada’ nature of the Spanish transition. They were also largely absent in the Greek case, which was characterized by swift recourse to

60 If the person identified in the case is still alive, or has been dead for less than 50 years, their file may be consulted only with permission from the individual concerned, or from their descendants. The majority of documents, with names expunged, are open for consultation.
the judicial system and by the strict definition of the ‘guilty parties’ (the officials who led the 1967 coup).61 The nature of the transition constituted an important ‘window of opportunity’ for the Portuguese type of transitional justice: simultaneously radical, diffuse and with little recourse to the judicial system.

The Portuguese transition eliminated, almost immediately, some institutional legacies and the more important élite that the dictatorship could have left to democracy. Not only were the regime’s most important political institutions dissolved, but the ‘authoritarian enclaves’ that had survived many of the transitional processes of the 1970s and 1980s were also eliminated and/or were subjected to complex processes that paralysed them. The dissolution of the more repressive institutions (such as the PIDE, the PSP Special Unit [Brigada de Choque] and the Portuguese Legion) was a fact, and some of them were subjected to processes that involved purging and criminalizing them.

In the Portuguese case, the majority of ‘authoritarian legacies’ were more a result of the nature of the transition than they were of the authoritarian regime. This was particularly so in the case of the large public sector and in the military prerogatives.62

In 1976, two years after the downfall of the authoritarian regime, the majority of the authoritarian legacies had been resolved, and the cleavages caused by the transition were already the most important legacies still existing. With the consolidation of Portugal’s democracy, the parties of the right made some attempts to criminalize the radical élites of 1975, but an ‘informal agreement’ to denounce both authoritarianism and the ‘excesses’ of 1975 marked the end of retroactive justice and the reintegration of a large proportion of those who had been condemned.

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62 Kathrine Hite and Leonardo Morlino (eds), Authoritarian Legacies and Democracy in Latin America and Southern Europe (Notre Dame, IN, 2004).